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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of Islamic banking on the causal linkages
between credit and gross domestic product (GDP) by comparing two sets of
seven emerging countries, the first without Islamic banks and the second with
a dual banking system including both Islamic and conventional banks. Unlike
previous studies, it checks the robustness of the results by applying both time
series and panel methods; moreover, it tests for both long‐ and short‐run
causality. In brief, the findings highlight significant differences between the
two sets of countries reflecting the distinctive features of Islamic banks.
Specifically, the time series analysis provides evidence of long‐run causality run-
ning from credit to GDP in countries with Islamic banks. This is confirmed by
the panel causality tests, although in this case short‐run causality in countries
without Islamic banks is also found.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The finance–growth nexus has been extensively investi-
gated in the literature, with mixed evidence: Some studies
reach the conclusion that financial development boosts
economic growth (e.g., Beck, Degryse, & Kneer, 2014;
King & Levine, 1993; McKinnon, 1973; Schumpeter,
1911; Shaw, 1973), whereas others argue that causality
runs in the opposite direction (e.g., Ang & McKibbin,
2007; Berthelemy & Varoudakis, 1996; Robinson, 1953);
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) have reported that the
linkage has become weaker over time. Moreover, there
is no consensus on how to measure financial develop-
ment and how to handle the endogeneity problem. Most
recently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
has focused on the role of credit and whether it might
be used as an early warning indicator, because excessive
lending is thought to be one of the main factors that have
caused the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. The
credit‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio was in fact
adopted by the Basel III committee (2010) as a guide to
build up countercyclical capital buffers during booms in
order to use them during crises (see Drehmann, 2013).
An interesting issue not thoroughly analysed in the
literature is whether the relationship between credit
and economic growth is different in countries with
Islamic banks. Such institutions are not allowed to
charge a predetermined interest rate, which is replaced
by the ex post profit and loss sharing (PLS) rate (Chong
& Liu, 2009). Further, they can only provide credit for
transactions related to a tangible, underlying asset and
cannot engage in any speculative activities (Hasan &
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Dridi, 2010; Kammer et al., 2015; Khan, 2010). Only a few
empirical studies of countries with Islamic banking exist.
Majid and Kassim (2010) find evidence supporting the
“supply‐leading” view. By contrast, Furqani and Mulyany
(2009) report that economic growth causes financial devel-
opment only in the short run in a country with Islamic
banking such as Malaysia—on the whole, their analysis
is consistent with the “demand‐following” view. Abduh
and Omar (2012) find bidirectional causality between
Islamic finance and economic growth in Indonesia. Most
recently, Imam and Kpodar (2016) conclude that countries
with Islamic banks experience faster economic growth
than those without Islamic banks.
The present paper aims to examine in depth the effects
of Islamic banking on the causal linkages between credit
and GDP by comparing two sets of seven emerging coun-
tries, the first without Islamic banks and the second with
a dual banking system including both Islamic and conven-
tional banks. Unlike previous studies, it checks the robust-
ness of the results by applying both time series and panel
methods. Moreover, it tests for both long‐ and short‐run
causality; the former has been analysed in the traditional
literature on the finance–growth nexus, whereas the latter
is relevant for the current debate on macroprudential pol-
icies and the attempt by the BIS to identify the best early
warning indicators. Our analysis also seeks to contribute
to the ongoing debate on whether the PLS paradigm of
Islamic banking might lead to an optimal distribution of
funds (Siddiqi, 1999) and on the role of Islamic finance
in promoting economic growth rather than causing an
increase in the price level by linking all financial transac-
tion to real economic activities (Chapra, 1992; Gulzar &
Masih, 2015; Kammer et al., 2015; Mills & Presley, 1999).
In brief, our findings highlight significant differences
between the two sets of countries. Specifically, the time
series analysis provides evidence of long‐run causality run-
ning from credit to GDP in countries with Islamic banks.
This is confirmed by the panel causality tests, although
in this case short‐run causality in countries without
Islamic banks is also found. The layout of the paper is as
follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the principles of Islamic
banking; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 outlines
the methodology; Section 5 discusses the empirical results;
and finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 | ISLAMIC BANKING
The principles of Islamic finance are based on the Quran,
hadith,1 and Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia). The first is
the prohibition of interest payment (Riba), defined by
some Islamic scholars as usury and by others as any
predetermined interest rate (Chong & Liu, 2009). In the
Holy Quran, 10 statements/verses condemned the prac-
tice of Riba or charging predetermined interest rate. For
example, the Surah/chapter al‐Baqarah says: “O you
who believe! Fear God and give up whatever remains of
Riba (usury), if you are believers” (Quran 2:278). Another
verse in the Surah al‐Baqarah distinguishes between Riba
and trading: “Allah has allowed trading and forbidden
Riba (usury)” (Quran 2:275). Further, Ebrahim,Molyneux,
and Ongena (2017) defined usury as an injunction to pro-
tect property rights. Therefore, many financial contracts
are constructed on the basis of the difference between
trading and Riba as well as Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia),
for instance, Musharaka (partnership), Mudharabah
(profit sharing), Murabahah (cost plus), and Ijarah (leas-
ing) contracts.2 Thus, Islamic financial institutions are
not allowed to make money through pure financing, and
financial contracts must be linked directly to real
economic activities (Gulzar & Masih, 2015; Kammer
et al., 2015). Each financial transaction is underpinned
by an existing or potential real asset, in contrast to the case
of conventional banks that can provide credit without such
constraints (see Askari, 2012; Siddiqi, 2006).
The second principle is based on the PLS paradigm
between the two parties of any financial contract, which
is seen as a crucial feature that distinguishes Islamic from
conventional banks. Furthermore, the conventional ex
ante interest rate, which is a risk‐shifting rate, is replaced
by the ex post PLS rate, which is instead a risk‐sharing
rate (Chong & Liu, 2009). This is thought to encourage
Islamic banks to invest in small and medium enterprises
and long‐term ventures and thus to stimulate economic
growth (Chapra, 1992; Mills & Presley, 1999). Solarin,
Hammoudeh, and Shahbaz (2018) argue that banks and
borrowers are involved in venture financing even though
Islamic financial transactions are expected to be based on
PLS. The prohibition of the conventional ex ante interest
rate is viewed as a foundation for improvements in both
social justice and economic efficiency (Berg & Kim,
2014; El‐Gamal, 2006).
The third principle does not allow Islamic banks to
engage in any speculative transactions, option and futures
contracts, hedging, toxic assets, gambling, and funding of
any activities, which are considered harmful to the com-
munity such as producing alcohol (Hasan & Dridi, 2010;
Kammer et al., 2015; Khan, 2010). It is thought that financ-
ing such activities would cause an increase in prices rather
than contributing to GDP. The fourth principle requires
asset backing: Transactions should be related to a tangible,
underlying asset. In addition, the main criterion for the
allocation of credit by Islamic banks is the productivity
of the project, instead of the creditworthiness of the cus-
tomer as in the case of conventional banks. Therefore,
credit is channelled to productive investment rather than
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speculative activities, which are not allowed according to
the principles of Islamic finance (Di Mauro et al., 2013).
Bernanke (2009) and Turner (2009) argue that excessive
and unproductive credit growth, investment in speculative
transactions, and interest‐based debt financing were in
fact some of the main causes of the 2007–2008 financial
crisis. In contrast, in the Islamic banking system, these
activities are either not allowed or partly mitigated—for
instance, as highlighted by Mohieldin (2012), asset‐backed
debt guarantees a direct relationship between loans and
the real economy. In this way, greater market discipline
and financial stability are achieved (Di Mauro et al.,
2013). Given the distinctive features of Islamic banking,
one would expect to find differences in the role of credit
between countries with and without Islamic banks. This
is the issue analysed in this study.
3 | DATA DESCRIPTION
We investigate the causal relationship between real credit
to the private sector and real GDP in 14 emerging countries
with sufficiently long time series. These are divided into
two groups (see Table 1): The first includes countries with-
out Islamic banks, specifically Latin American countries
with a similar level of development to those with Islamic
banks and without recent long periods of colonial history
affecting their institutions (viz., Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru); the second
includes countries with both Islamic and conventional
banks according to the Bankscope database (Malaysia,
Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Singapore, and Tunisia).
Oil‐exporting countries with Islamic banks are excluded
from the sample because their economic growth might be
mainly driven by oil revenues rather than financial devel-
opment or credit. However, Iran has been included
because its economy has many other industrial sectors
and does not depend solely on oil revenues.
The data source is the International Monetary Fund
database. The (seasonally adjusted) series are credit to the
private sector (Cr), GDP, and the consumer prices index
(CPI). These have been logged, and real credit (RCR) and
GDP (RGDP) series have been created using the price
deflator. The model we estimate to analyse the causal link-
ages between real credit and real GDP also includes the fol-
lowing variables: the real exchange rate (REXt), the
inflation rate (INFt), and the real interest rate (It). The real
exchange rate (EXt) is added as an international variable
that might potentially influence GDP. The real interest rate
affects consumption and investment decision, which have
an impact on demand for credit from banks as well as eco-
nomic growth (Kassim, 2016). The inflation rate is a mea-
sure of price stability that can have effects on both the
financial sector and the real economy. The choice of these
additional variables is in line with existing empirical stud-
ies such as Gheeraert (2014), Kassim (2016), Abedifar,
Hasan, and Tarazi (2016), and Imam and Kpodar (2016).
Following the International Monetary Fund definition
of credit,3 we calculated credit as gross credit injected into
all private sectors of the economy, that is, excluding credit
to the government. This is because credit to the private sec-
tor increases in boom periods and decreases during credit
crunches or crises, whereas credit to the public sector
moves in the opposite direction (see Drehmann, Borio, &
Tsatsaronis, 2011).
The credit to GDP ratio in countries without Islamic
banks was around 20–30% in 2001 in most of these coun-
tries. It then increased reaching around 60% in Brazil and
Costa Rica in 2016. However, it is much higher in Chile,
where it increased from 64.48% in 2001 to 80.76% in 2016
(see Figure 1). On the other hand, most countries with
Islamic banks have a higher credit to GDP ratio, which
was above 60% in 2001 except for Indonesia and Turkey,
where it reached 66.20% in 2016 (see Figure 2). Singapore
and Malaysia experienced a decrease in this ratio between
2001 and 2007–2008, and then it increased to around
TABLE 1 Sample of countries
Data set 1: Seven countries
without Islamic
banks Period
Data set 2: Seven countries
with Islamic
banks Period
Argentina 1993Q1–2016Q4 Indonesia 2001Q4–2016Q4
Brazil 2001Q4–2016Q4 Turkey 2001Q4–2016Q4
Chile 1997Q4–2016Q4 Iran 1994Q1–2007Q4a
Costa Rica 2001Q4–2016Q4 Singapore 2003Q1–2016Q4
Ecuador 2001Q4–2016Q4 Jordan 1992Q1–2016Q4
Guatemala 2001Q4–2016Q4 Tunisia 2000Q1–2015Q3
Peru 1996Q1–2016Q4 Malaysia 2001Q4–2016Q4
aData are not available for Iran beyond 2007.
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125% in 2016. Overall, the credit to GDP ratio appears to
be higher in countries with Islamic banks in comparison
with those with only conventional banks.
4 | METHODOLOGY
The statistical approach taken in this study involves three
steps. First, the order of integration of the variables is
determined by means of unit root tests. Second, the exis-
tence of long‐run equilibrium relationships is tested using
cointegration techniques as in Johansen (1988, 1995).
Third, Granger causality tests are carried out on the basis
of the findings from the cointegration analysis—in the
context of a vector autoregression or a vector error correc-
tion model (VECM), respectively, depending on whether
cointegration does not or does hold. In the former case,
the model is the following:
ΔRGDPt ¼α1 þ ∑
k
i¼1
β1iΔRGDPt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
φ1iΔRCRt−i
þ ∑
k
i¼1
∂1iΔEXt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
γ1iΔINFt−i
þ ∑
k
i¼1
δ1iΔIt−i þ ϵ1t;
(1)
ΔRCRt ¼α2 þ ∑
k
i¼1
φ2iΔRCRt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
β2iΔRGDPt−i
þ ∑
k
i¼1
∂2iΔEXt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
γ2iΔINFt−i
þ ∑
k
i¼1
δ2iΔIt−i þ ϵ2t;
(2)
where RGDPt is the log of real GDP whereas RCRt stands
for the log of real credit to the private sector, EXt is the
real exchange rate, INFt is the inflation rate, It is the real
interest rate, Δ is the first difference operator, α1 and α2
are constant drifts, βji, φji, ∂ji, γji, and δji are polynomials
of order k – 1, and ϵ1t and ϵ2t are the residuals. Failure
to reject the null hypothesis of H0:∑
k
i¼1
φ1i ¼ 0 implies that
real credit to the private sector does not Granger‐cause
real GDP. Similarly, failure to reject the null hypothesis
of H0:∑
k
i¼1
β2i ¼ 0 implies that real GDP does not
Granger‐cause real credit to the private sector.
Following Engle and Granger (1987), if the order of
integration of the series is I(1) and they are cointegrated,
an error correction term (ECT) is introduced into the
model. Therefore, a VECM is specified as follows:
FIGURE 1 Credit to gross domestic
product ratio in countries without Islamic
banks [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Credit to gross domestic
product ratio in countries with Islamic
banks [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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ΔRGDPt ¼α1 þ ∑
k
i¼1
β1iΔRGDPt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
φ1iΔRCRt−i
þ ∑
k
i¼1
∂1iΔEXt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
γ1iΔINFt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
δ1iΔIt−i
þ θ1ECTt−1 þ ϵ1t;
(3)
ΔRCRt ¼α2 þ ∑
k
i¼1
φ2iΔRCRt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
β2iΔRGDPt−i
þ ∑
k
i¼1
∂2iΔEXt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
γ2iΔINFt−i þ ∑
k
i¼1
δ2iΔIt−i
þ θ2ECTt−1 þ ϵ2t;
(4)
where α1 and α2 are constant drifts, ECTt − 1 is the error
correction term, which represents the deviations from the
long‐run cointegration relationship, and θ1 and θ2 denote
the speeds of adjustment towards the long‐run equilib-
rium, which are expected to be negative.
Therefore, there are two sources of causality between
the two variables of interest RGDPt and RCRt, either
through the error correction term (ECTt − 1) or through
the lagged dynamic terms ΔRCRt − i in Equation (3) or
ΔRGDPt − i in Equation (4). Consequently, one can test
for three types of causality between real GDP and real
credit to the private sector. First, one can test whether
ΔRCRt Granger‐causes ΔRGDPt in the short run by carry-
ing out a Wald test of the null hypothesis H0:∑
k
i¼1
φ1i ¼ 0.
Second, one can test for long‐run causality by performing
a weak exogeneity test on the coefficient of the lagged
error correction term ECTt − 1. Failure to reject the null
hypothesis H0 : θ1 = 0 implies that real credit to the pri-
vate sector does not Granger‐cause real GDP in the long
run. Third, strong exogeneity can be tested by testing
the joint significance of the coefficients on the lagged
dynamic terms and the lagged error correction term
(Engle, Hendry & Richard, 1983; Charemza & Deadman,
1992). The null hypothesis in this case is
H0:∑
k
i¼1
φ1i ¼ θ1 ¼ 0. However, this test does not allow
to distinguish between long‐ and short‐run causality
(Ang & McKibbin, 2007).4
Time series techniques have been criticized because
small sample distortions can affect the power of standard
unit root and cointegration tests (see Christopoulos &
Tsionas, 2004). These issues can be addressed using panel
approaches (Ang, 2008) to carry out cointegration tests
with higher power (Persyn & Westerlund, 2008). Hsiao,
Mountain, and Ho‐Illman (1995) argue that the panel
approach yields more accurate inference. Further, this
approach provided information on individual units and
intertemporal dynamics, which might help in controlling
the impact of unobserved or missing variables (Hsiao,
2007). The possible issue of collinearity between the cur-
rent and lag variables (which is highly possible in time
series) can be alleviated because of the interindividual
differences (Griliches, 1967; Pakes & Griliches, 1984).
With this in mind, we also apply various panel methods
to check the robustness of our findings (see below).
5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 | Unit root tests
As a first step, we carry out a battery of unit root tests to
examine the stochastic properties of the individual series
using augmented Dickey–Fuller (Dickey & Fuller, 1981)
and Phillips–Perron tests (Phillips & Perron, 1988). These
tests suggest that our variables are nonstationary I(1) in
the countries with and without Islamic banks. We also
applied panel unit root tests, namely, the MW (Maddala
& Wu, 1999) and Im–Pesaran–Shin tests (Im, Pesaran,
& Shin, 2003),5 which confirm that the variables can be
characterized as I(1).6
5.2 | Cointegration tests
Next, we test for the existence of a long‐run relationship
between real credit to the private sector and real GDP.
For this purpose, we use both time series (Johansen,
1988, 1995) and panel cointegration (Westerlund, 2007)
methods.7 Because the multivariate tests of Johansen
(1988, 1995) are very sensitive to the lag length (see
Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, & Hendry, 1993; Chang &
Caudill, 2005; Cheung & Lai, 1993), we use the Schwarz
information criterion to determine the optimal lag length
but include extra lags when required to remove serial cor-
relation (as in Hunter & Menla Ali, 2014, where the
Akaike information criterion is used instead). We run
diagnostic tests for the residuals with the the Breusch–
Godfrey serial correlation LM test providing no evidence
of any remaining serial correlation. Further, the null
hypothesis of both homoscedasticity and normality can-
not be rejected in any cases. Thus, we conclude that the
vector autoregression models are data congruent and
carry out the Johansen cointegration tests using the cho-
sen optimal lag length.8 Furthermore, to achieve normal-
ity in the presence of some outliers in the data, the
following dummies were included to remove the effect
of extreme observations: Chile 2008Q1, Argentina
2002Q3, Guatemala 2005Q4, Tunisia 2011Q1, Jordan
2008Q1, and Singapore 2008Q4. These outliers mainly
correspond to the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis, the
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2001 dot‐com bubble crisis in the United States, and the
start of the Arab spring in Tunisia in January 2011. Juselius
(2007) pointed out that ignoring the issue of outliers in the
data would produce unreliable results. We follow Dimitraki
and Menla Ali (2015) and control for outliers defined as
such when the residual is greater than |3.5σ|.9
On the basis of the trace and eigenvalues statistics, the
null of no cointegration is rejected at the 1% and 5% levels
in the countries without Islamic banks (see Table 2, Panel
A), as well as those with Islamic banks (see Table 2, Panel
B); therefore, it appears that there is a stable long‐run rela-
tionship between credit and GDP in every case.10
Next, we carry out panel cointegration tests, specifi-
cally an error correction‐based panel cointegration test
(Westerlund, 2007). Westerlund (2007) criticizes the panel
residual‐based tests (e.g., Kao, 1999; Pedroni, 2004),
pointing out in particular that the common factor restric-
tion might be invalid, and proposes four more advanced
panel cointegration tests with higher power. The first
two, Gτ and Gα, are based on group‐mean test statistics,
which test the alternative hypothesis that the panel as a
whole is cointegrated, whereas the other two, pτ and pα,
are pooled test statistics, which are designed to test the
alternative that at least one of the individual cross‐sec-
tional units is cointegrated (Persyn & Westerlund, 2008).
The results for these tests are reported in Table 3. It can
be seen that both group‐mean statistics reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration in all three panels (com-
prising countries with and without Islamic banks and all
countries in turn), suggesting the existence of a long‐run
relationship between real credit to the private sector and
real GDP in each case. However, the other two panel sta-
tistics fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration
between the two variables.
5.3 | Causality tests
Next, we apply both time series and panel approaches to
test for three types of causality (where the null hypothesis
is that of no causality): short‐run causality, using lags of
the explanatory variables; long‐run causality (weak
exogeneity), using the error correction term; and strong
exogeneity, using both lags and the error correction term.
As already mentioned, we estimate a VECM given the
previous test results suggesting that cointegration holds
between real credit to the private sector and real GDP.
TABLE 2 Results of the Johansen cointegration tests
Null hypothesis: r = 0; alternative null: r = 1
Maximum eigenvalue test Trace test
Max‐Eigen
statistic (λmax)
95% critical
value p value
Trace
statistic (λtrace)
95% critical
value p value K
Panel A. Countries without Islamic banks
Argentina 20.301 19.387 0.036** 28.015 25.872 0.027** 6
Brazil 38.677 15.892 0.000*** 51.751 20.261 0.000*** 5
Chile 24.006 19.387 0.001*** 29.344 25.872 0.000*** 3
Costa Rica 31.778 15.892 0.000*** 37.953 20.261 0.018** 3
Ecuador 51.687 15.892 0.000*** 55.901 20.261 0.000*** 6
Guatemala 21.428 19.387 0.024** 32.450 25.872 0.006*** 6
Peru 22.330 19.387 0.018** 31.474 25.872 0.009*** 3
Panel B. Countries with Islamic banks
Indonesia 19.768 15.892 0.011** 24.024 20.261 0.015** 5
Turkey 25.734 15.892 0.001*** 34.426 20.261 0.000*** 5
Iran 21.888 14.264 0.003*** 21.913 15.494 0.005*** 6
Singapore 26.653 19.387 0.004*** 29.468 25.872 0.017** 3
Jordan 15.937 14.264 0.027** 19.701 15.494 0.011** 4
Tunisia 19.742 19.387 0.044** 27.771 25.872 0.029** 3
Malaysia 17.221 14.264 0.016** 18.425 15.494 0.017** 5
Note. The table reports the Max‐Eigen statistics and Johansen trace statistics (Johansen, 1995). r is the number of cointegration vectors. K is the number of lag
lengths based on Schwarz information criterion, subject to the removal of serial correlation. Our model includes RCR (real credit to the private sector), RGDP
(real GDP), and three exogenous variables (EX is the real exchange rate, INF is the inflation rate, and I is the real interest rate).
**Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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We test for causality within a VECM framework for
the countries where cointegration holds according to
the Johansen tests. The results are reported in Tables 4
and 5 (t statistic and F statistics), respectively. Our anal-
ysis focuses mainly on the causal relationship between
the two variables of interest in this paper, namely, real
credit and real GDP. Real credit to the private sector
causes real GDP in the short run in Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, and Costa Rica at the 1% and 5% levels and
at the 10% level in Guatemala. Bidirectional short‐run
TABLE 3 Results of the Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration test
Panel A. Countries without Islamic banks Panel B. Countries with Islamic banks Panel C. All countries
Test Value z value p value Value z value p value Value z value p value
Gτ −4.748 −7.880 0.000*** −4.563 −7.272 0.000*** −4.656 −10.714 0.000***
Gα −21.55 −3.840 0.000*** −22.10 −4.058 0.000*** −23.59 −6.580 0.000***
pτ −5.128 0.538 0.705 −4.322 1.477 0.930 −6.820 1.264 0.897
pα −7.218 0.769 0.779 −7.115 0.815 0.792 −8.285 0.419 0.662
Note. The lag length and the leads are selected according to the Akaike information criterion. p values are one‐sided test based on the normal distribution. τ and
α refer to different test statistics. pτ and pα are pooled test statistics; Gτ and Gα are group‐mean test statistics. For further information about both pooled and
group‐mean test statistics, refer to Persyn and Westerlund (2008). Our model includes RCR (real credit to the private sector), RGDP (real GDP), and three exog-
enous variables (EX is the real exchange rate, INF is the inflation rate, and I is the real interest rate).
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
TABLE 4 Error correction model (ECM) test with Johansen cointegrating vectors for countries without Islamic banks
Panel A: H0 : ΔRCR ↛ ΔGDP
SR Granger noncausality test
(H0 : all φ1i = 0)
LR weak exogeneity test
(H0 : θ1 = 0)
SR + LR strong exogeneity test
(H0 : all φ1i = θ1 = 0)
Country K F stata p values ECTt − 1 t stat
c p values F statb p values
Argentina 6 3.107 0.011** 0.056 2.737 0.008*** 3.288 0.006***
Brazil 5 3.322 0.045** −0.353 −2.278 0.027** 5.000 0.004***
Chile 3 1.0498 0.356 −0.083 −2.610 0.011** 2.315 0.085*
Costa Rica 3 4.712 0.007*** −0.187 −2.942 0.005*** 4.418 0.005***
Ecuador 6 2.968 0.047** −0.629 −2.898 0.013** 4.264 0.012**
Guatemala 6 2.410 0.064* −0.176 −0.906 0.373 2.075 0.092*
Peru 3 0.709 0.588 −0.021 −1.346 0.183 4.572 0.001***
Panel B: H0 : ΔGDP ↛ ΔRCR
SR Granger noncausality test
(H0 : all φ2i = 0)
LR weak exogeneity test
(H0 : θ2 = 0)
SR + LR strong exogeneity test
(H0 : all φ2i = θ2 = 0)
Country K F stat p values ECTt − 1 t stat p values F stat p values
Argentina 6 1.007 0.4308 −0.047 −2.432 0.018** 1.326 0.257
Brazil 5 1.394 0.258 −0.038 −3.989 0.000*** 5.884 0.000***
Chile 3 1.246 0.295 −0.011 −1.076 0.286 0.993 0.402
Costa Rica 3 4.564 0.008*** −0.120 −3.394 0.001*** 4.064 0.007***
Ecuador 7 7.927 0.001*** −0.127 −4.293 0.001*** 7.360 0.001***
Peru 5 0.050 0.995 −0.088 −2.366 0.021** 1.314 0.272
Guatemala 5 2.780 0.039** −0.146 −2.278 0.031** 2.434 0.054*
Note. K is number of lags in ECM. In Panel A, F stata is of the Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypothesis H0 : all φ1i = 0, F stat
b is of the
Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypothesis H0 : all φ1i = θ1 = 0, and t stat
c is of the Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypoth-
esis H0 : θ1 = 0. Panels A and B are estimated using Equations (3) and (4), respectively. SR is short sun and LR is long run.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Granger causality is found in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and
Guatemala.
As for the long‐run weak exogeneity tests, the null
hypothesis of noncausality from real credit to the private
sector to real GDP is not rejected in Peru and Guatemala
at any level. The error correction term has a negative sign
in all countries except Argentina. On the other hand,
long‐run causality from real GDP to real credit to the pri-
vate sector is found in all countries without Islamic banks
except for Chile (see Table 4, Panel B). Finally, the strong
exogeneity tests suggest bidirectional causality in all
countries except Argentina, Chile, and Peru (see Table 4).
There is evidence of short‐run unidirectional causality
from real credit to the private sector to real GDP in all
countries with Islamic banks except for Singapore and
Malaysia and short‐run bidirectional causality only in
Iran at the 10% level (see Table 5, Panel A). The weak
exogeneity tests indicate that both variables are weakly
exogenous at the 5% level in all countries with Islamic.
The strong exogeneity tests imply unidirectional causality
except for Iran. Long‐run causality from real GDP to real
credit is found only in two countries, namely, Tunisia at
the 5% level and Turkey at the 10% level. It is noteworthy
that in the long run, real GDP causes real credit to the
private sector in the countries without Islamic banks,
whereas causality runs in the opposite direction in the
countries with Islamic banks. In brief, our results provide
strong evidence of long‐run causality running from real
credit to real GDP and weak evidence of bidirectional
short‐run causality in countries with Islamic banks. In
contrast, for the countries without Islamic banks, there
is strong evidence of long‐run causality running from real
GDP to real credit.
These findings can be explained in terms of the prin-
ciples of Islamic finance. As previously mentioned,
Islamic banks spur economic growth by providing credit
for productive investment (Gulzar & Masih, 2015;
Kammer et al., 2015), their financial transactions being
linked to real assets (Askari, 2012; Siddiqi, 2006). More-
over, they provide credit to households and firms not
TABLE 5 Error correction model (ECM) test with Johansen cointegrating vectors for countries with Islamic banks
Panel A: H0 : ΔRCR ↛ ΔGDP
SR Granger noncausality test
(H0 : all φ1i = 0)
LR weak exogeneity test
(H0 : θ1 = 0)
SR + LR strong exogeneity test
(H0 : all φ1i = θ1 = 0 = 0)
Country K F statª p values ECTt − 1 t stat p values F stat
b p values
Indonesia 5 2.949 0.032** −0.072 −2.807 0.009*** 5.315 0.001***
Turkey 5 2.888 0.035** −0.461 −3.174 0.004*** 3.040 0.023**
Iran 6 2.953 0.024** −0.460 −2.573 0.016** 6.472 0.000***
Singapore 3 0.605 0.616 −0.039 −2.444 0.020** 1.976 0.122***
Jordan 4 5.307 0.000*** −0.087 −2.023 0.047** 4.633 0.001***
Malaysia 5 0.213 0.808 −0.054 −3.507 0.000*** 6.268 0.001***
Tunisia 3 5.829 0.002*** −0.024 −2.245 0.030** 5.573 0.001***
Panel B: H0 : ΔGDP ↛ ΔRCR
SR Granger noncausality test
(H0 : all φ2i = 0)
LR weak exogeneity test
(H0 : θ2 = 0)
SR + LR strong exogeneity test
(H0 : all φ2i = θ2 = 0)
Country K F stat p values ECTt − 1 t stat p values F statª p valuesª
Indonesia 5 1.201 0.335 −0.078 1.405 0.171 1.046 0.418
Turkey 5 1.079 0.395 −0.056 1.823 0.080* 1.083 0.399
Iran 6 2.405 0.055* −0.152 1.058 0.299 2.099 0.079*
Singapore 3 1.511 0.231 −0.004 0.860 0.396 1.542 0.215
Jordan 4 1.044 0.390 −0.055 −0.946 0.347 1.117 0.359
Malaysia 5 2.031 0.143 −0.083 1.281 0.206 1.357 0.267
Tunisia 3 0.658 0.582 −0.008 −2.269 0.028** 1.818 0.144
Note. K is number of lags in ECM. In Panel A, F statª is of the Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypothesis H0 : all φ1i = 0, F stat
b is of the
Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypothesis H0 : all φ1i = θ1 = 0, and t stat
a is of the Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypoth-
esis H0 : θ1 = 0. Panels A and B are estimated using Equations (3) and (4), respectively. SR is short sun and LR is long run.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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normally dealing with the financial system for religious
reasons. Further, Islamic banks are more likely to provide
funds to small and medium‐sized enterprises, which
results in higher financial inclusion and possibly higher
economic growth (Ebrahim et al., 2017; Imam & Kpodar,
2016). Our findings are in line with those of Kassim
(2016) and Imam and Kpodar (2016), who reported that
Islamic banks have a measurable impact on economic
growth. Although Choudhury (1999) found no evidence
that Islamic banking stimulates output growth in a sam-
ple of countries including Turkey, his results might sim-
ply reflect the lack of Shariah law‐complaint financial
products (see Johnson, 2013). Further, Goaied and Sassi
(2010) found that Islamic banks do not contribute to eco-
nomic growth in the oil producing countries (which are
excluded from our sample) and this might be explained
by the problem facing those countries, known as “the
crux of the Dutch disease.”11 Our findings in countries
with Islamic banks support the supply‐leading theory
according to which financial institutions increase the sup-
ply of credit and therefore GDP (Beck et al., 2014; King &
Levine, 1993).
As for the countries without Islamic banks, our find-
ings do not support the idea that credit or financial devel-
opment has a crucial role in stimulating economic growth
(see King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998, among
others). This could be because the effects of credit and
financial services depend on the allocation of loans to
productive investment projects (see Ang & McKibbin,
2007). A weak effect could reflect an increase in credit
in conjunction with a lack of monitoring from banks
(see Gavin & Hausmann, 1996).
TABLE 6 Results of the panel causality tests
Panel A: H0 : ΔCr ↛ ΔGDP
SR Granger noncausality test
(H0 : all φ1, i, k = 0)
LR weak exogeneity test
(H0 : θ1, i = 0)
SR + LR strong exogeneity
(H0 : all φ1, i, k = θ1, i = 0)
K F statistic p values t statistic p values F statisticª p values
Panel A1. Countries without Islamic banks
8 8.104 0.000*** 1.551 0.122 8.766 0.000***
Panel A2. Countries with Islamic banks
9 1.532 0.136 −2.555 0.011** 2.386 0.009***
Panel A2. All countries
7 3.83 0.009*** −0.631 0.527 3.433 0.004***
Panel B: H0 : ΔGDP ↛ ΔCr
SR Granger noncausality test
(H0 : all β2, i, k = 0)
LR weak exogeneity test
(H0 : θ2, i = 0)
SR + LR strong exogeneity test
(H0 : all β2, i, k = θ2, i = 0)
K F statistic p values t statistic p values F statisticª p valuesª
Panel B1. Countries without Islamic banks
8 7.357 0.025** −2.313 0.021** 18.112 0.000***
Panel B2. Countries with Islamic banks
9 1.193 0.298 −1.696 0.090* 1.394 0.175
Panel B3. All countries
7 2.627 0.011** −1.984 0.047** 3.242 0.001***
Note. K is number of lags in error correction model. The total panel observations are 499, 402, and 901 for countries without Islamic banks, with Islamic banks,
and all countries, respectively. F statistic is of the Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypothesis H0 : all φ1, i, k = 0, F statisticª is of the Wald
statistics test for the significance of the null hypothesis H0 : all φ1, i, k = θ1i = 0, and t statistic is of the Wald statistics test for the significance of the null hypoth-
esis H0 : θ1i = 0. Panels A and B are estimated using Equations (5) and (6), respectively. SR is short sun and LR is long run.
ΔRGDPit ¼ α1i þ∑mK¼1 β1;i;kΔRGDPi;t−k þ∑mk¼1 φ1;i;kΔRCRi;t−k þ∑mk¼1∂1i;kΔEXi;t−k þ∑mk¼1γ1iΔINFi;t−k þ∑mk¼1δ1;i;kΔIi;t−k þ θ1;i;kECT i;t−1 þ ϵ1;i;t ; (5)
ΔRCRit ¼ α2i þ∑mk¼1 φ2;i;kΔRCRi;t−k þ∑mk¼1 β2;i;kΔRGDPi;t−k þþ∑mk¼2∂1i;kΔEXi;t−k þ∑mk¼2γ1iΔINFi;t−k þ∑mk¼1δ2;i;kΔIi;t−k þ θ2iECTi;t−1 þ ϵ2;i;t : (6)
*Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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The panel causality test results are shown in Table 6.
As already mentioned, the lag length is selected according
to the Schwarz Bayesian criterion subject to the removal
of the serial correlation in the error term. In the countries
with Islamic banks, long‐run causality from real credit to
real GDP is found at the 5% level while the F statistic
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no causality in the
short run (see Table 6, Panel A2). By contrast, short‐run
causality from real credit to GDP is found for countries
without Islamic banks (see Table 6, Panel A1). There is
evidence of long‐run causality from real GDP to real
credit in countries without Islamic banks (there is also
some weaker evidence, at the 10% level, in countries with
Islamic banks), but no evidence of short‐run causality in
countries with Islamic banks (see Table 6, Panel B). The
diagnostic tests (not reported) suggest data congruence.
Further, to check the stability of our models, we run
both the cumulative sum and the cumulative sum of
squares with recursive residuals following Pesaran and
Pesaran (1997). Both tests show that the values of the coef-
ficients stay within the boundaries of the 5% significance
level, so the null hypothesis of stable coefficients is
accepted for both the short‐run and long‐run parameters
in our ECM models (see Brown, Durbin, & Evans, 1975;
Samargandi, Fidrmuc, & Ghosh, 2014; see Figures B1,
B2, B3, B4 for a sample of the results; full results are
available on request).
On the whole, the long‐run results obtained from the
two approaches are rather similar: Both suggest that real
GDP causes real credit in the countries without Islamic
banks except for Chile, whereas there is causality in the
opposite direction in the countries with Islamic banks.
Bidirectional short‐run causality is found in two countries
without Islamic banks (Ecuador Costa Rica and
Guatemala, at the 1% level) and one with Islamic banks
(Iran, at the 5% level). However, there are differences
between the two sets of short‐run results: The panel tests
suggest that short‐run causality runs from real credit to real
GDP in countries without Islamic banks (and that there is
bidirectional causality in one of them,i.e., Iran). Compared
with the time series results, the individual countries reveal
different causal relationship across the two samples. Time
series approaches raise various issues related to the sample
size and the power of unit root tests (Christopoulos &
Tsionas, 2004), which we have addressed by performing
panel tests as well (Persyn & Westerlund, 2008).
6 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the relationship between real
credit to the private sector and real GDP in two sets of
emerging countries, with and without Islamic banks,
with the aim of shedding light on the effects of
Islamic banking on economic growth. Our extensive
cointegration and causality analysis provide strong evi-
dence of long‐run causality running from real credit to
real GDP and weak evidence of short‐run causality in
both directions in the countries with Islamic banks. In
contrast, long‐run causality appears to run in the opposite
direction, that is, from real GDP to real credit, in the
countries without Islamic banks. These differences
between the two sets of countries can be plausibly
attributed to the distinctive features of Islamic banks,
which provide loans to projects that are directly linked
to real economic activities and are not allowed to engage
in speculative transactions, in this way improving the
allocation of resources in the economy and boosting
long‐run economic growth.
Therefore, one could argue that policymakers aiming
to stimulate growth should regulate commercial banks
to increase the proportion of credit to productive
investment and impose limits on engaging in speculative
transactions; this is clearly an important issue, given the
current debate on the causes of the global financial crisis,
and the mounting evidence that excessive credit growth
to finance speculative, unproductive activities was one
of its main causes (see Bernanke, 2009; Turner, 2009).
In addition, they should favour a bigger market share
for Islamic banks in the countries where they are present.
Future research should also consider possible non‐lin-
earities in the relationship between credit and growth
and examine the robustness of the results by using other
measures of credit such as total credit, the credit‐to‐GDP
gap, and credit to nonfinancial sector (see Drehmann
et al., 2011; Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014).12
ENDNOTES
1 Hadith stands for the actions and quotations of the Prophet Mohammad,
which are one of the main sources of Islamic guidance in many aspects of
Muslim life including economic activities.
2 For more details, see Appendix A.
3
“Claims on private sector include gross credit from the financial system to
individuals, enterprises, nonfinancial public entities not included under
net domestic credit, and financial institutions not included elsewhere”
(IMF‐IFS line 32d).
4 Note that the panel approach follows the same estimation process.
5 For further details on panel unit root tests, see Harris and Sollis (2003),
Banerjee (1999), Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), and Breitung and
Pesaran (2008), among others.
6 These tests are not reported but are available upon request.
7 The Engle–Granger cointegration test results suggest the existence of a
cointegration relationship between credit and GDP only in Ecuador
and Iran (these results are available upon request). However, it is well
known that the Engle–Granger cointegration tests have low power in
the case of a relatively short sample such as ours (see Banerjee, Dolado,
Hendry, & Smith, 1986; Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Kremers, Erics-
son, & Dolado, 1992).
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8 These tests are not reported but are available upon request.
9 For a more detailed discussion about including a dummy variable when
testing for cointegration, see Juselius and MacDonald (2004).
10 The ECT confirms the existence of a long‐run relationship between the
two variables in our models. Further, the large deviations from the long
run seem to be caused by the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007 recent finan-
cial crisis in most countries in our sample (see Figures C1, C2, C3, C4).
11 The Dutch disease is defined as the negative impact on an economy of any
factors that increase the inflow of foreign currency, such as oil reserves
(see Apergis, El‐Montasser, Sekyere, Ajmi, & Gupta, 2014).
12 Note, however, that the new data set constructed by the BIS (total credit to
the nonfinancial sector) is only available for 40 advanced and emerging
economies.
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APPENDIX A
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MODELS
Islamic financial
models Explanation
Musharaka
(partnership)
It is built on the idea of equity participation. Under Musharaka contract, each participant pays a percentage of the
capital in the company. The profits or losses generated from the business will be shared between the owners
based on an agreed profits and losses share called PLS (Ariff, 1988).
Mudharabah
(profit sharing)
Mudharabah is a contract between two parties: One party supplies the capital of the company, whereas the other
party will be considered as an entrepreneur. Therefore, the Islamic bank becomes a shareholder on the bases that
any profit or loss occurring from the business is shared between the two parties on a per‐determined profit
sharing percentage (Haron, Ahmad, & Planisek, 1994).
Murabahah
(cost plus)
It is a financial contract for buying and selling a particular product. A Murabahah contract should specify the price,
the cost of the item, and the profit margin at the time of signing the contract. The role of the bank in a
Murabahah financial instrument is to finance purchasing the good by buying it on the behalf of the customer.
The bank will resell it to the customer after adding a markup to the cost price (Ariff, 1988; Haron et al., 1994).
Ijarah (leasing) The Ijarah refers to an agreement between the lessor and the client to rent for example machinery, vehicles, a shop,
or any other equipment. An Islamic bank using an Ijarah financial instrument will buy the machinery or any other
equipment and lease it to its customers for an agreed rent. If the customer requires the bank to buy the equipment
as well, the rent and a monthly instalment as a part of the purchase will be incurred (Zaher & Kabir Hassan, 2001).
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APPENDIX B
FIGURE B1 Plot of cumulative sum (CUSUM) test for coefficient stability of error correction model—countries with Islamic banks
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE B2 Plot of cumulative sum (CUSUM) of squares test for coefficient stability of error correction model—Countries with Islamic
banks [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
CAPORALE AND HELMI 471
FIGURE B3 Plot of cumulative sum (CUSUM) test for coefficient stability of error correction model—Countries without Islamic banks
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE B4 Plot of cumulative sum (CUSUM) test for coefficient stability of error correction model—Countries without Islamic banks
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE C1 Plot of the error correction term (ECT) for countries with Islamic banks (Cr‐GDP) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE C2 Plot of the error correction term (ECT) for countries with Islamic banks (GDP‐Cr) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE C3 Plot of the error correction term (ECT) for countries without Islamic banks (Cr‐GDP) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE C4 Plot of the error correction term (ECT) for countries without Islamic banks (GDP‐Cr) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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